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Improving Co-operation on the Bridge 
Preliminary study 
Foreword 
The bridge is the focal point of the management of operations on a ship. Due to its 
functional character, it can best be described with the term "nerve centre." In order to 
ensure safety and efficiency of the ships operations it is important that all the bridge 
operations have been appropriately organized into a seamless co-operation of the 
 watchkeeping  personnel. It is also necessary that the personnel can take the best 
advantage of the vessels technical systems. In order for the ship to function efficiently it is 
important that the personnel and especially the master of the ship are familiar with co- 
operational methods and current regulations as well as the characteristics and technical 
systems of the ship. 
IMO committees have paid attention to bridge operations, or their deficiencies, on many 
levels. It is expected that the current deficiencies will be corrected by international 
regulations. Finalizing of these regulations may take years, and after the national 
recognition of this problem it is not practical to stay put and wait for the improvement of 
the state of affairs. 
This development report concentrates especially on the role of the  watchkeeping personnel 
as a part of the bridge operations, and on the capacity of the individual in a high-pressure 
work environment. 
This report can be regarded as a preliminary study which will lead to further research and 
to the directing of the watchkeeping crews bridge work with a directions model. 
Helsinki, 2 February, 2007  
Paavo Wihuri 
Director of Maritime Safety of the Finnish Maritime Administration  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Starting Point 
This report is based on the need identified by the Finnish Maritime Administration to 
assess how the current training and work direction can affect the operations of bridge 
personnel on a practical level. Finnish Maritime Administration  (FMA) also wanted to 
analyze how bridge operations can be improved for enhanced safety at sea. The 
research was carried out by  Huperman Ltd. 
Researches concerning maritime safety often point out that hazardous situations are 
mostly results of human error  (E.G. SOLAS, Annex 24). On one hand this problem 
has been addressed by developing technical solutions to reduce the risk involved with 
the operations of the bridge personnel, and on the other hand by trying to affect the 
operations and individual performance of the bridge personnel with training and 
instructions. 
The maritime long history has established strong and deep-seated operation culture 
and practices connected with it. Attempts have been made to improve maritime 
human error management with Bridge Resource Management training (BRM). Its goal 
is to try to find ways to improve the expertise on making the best use of the 
resources of the bridge personnel. BRM training is based on a framework and training 
programmes developed in the field of aviation earlier where the aim was to improve 
cockpit crew co-operation especially with regard to communication, leadership and 
decision making (FMA, 1997). 
According to the background research preceding the report it is safe to assume that, 
as for its content or method of implementation,  BRM training does not fully address 
the challenges involved in real-life operations. Thus one of the main objectives of the 
report was to chart ways to affect operations on a practical level with the current 
training practices. 
Background theories of the analysis included some of the latest models applied in 
improving crew operations in other safety critical industries. Questions were prepared 
based on these models in order to determine how the crew operates on the bridge in 
the real life setting, which factors determine the formation of common practices and 
how the actors themselves interpret their work and work environment. This enabled 
estimation of how the current working practices of the bridge based on experience or 
training supported the recent views on the features of safety critical work. 
This report especially aimed to highlight the practical point of views of bridge work 
with regard to bridge personnel. On account of this, examination of environmental 
and background factors was limited only to those factors that explain the actions of 
the personnel, or, which were considered to affect these actions directly. 
1.2 Objectives and Outlining 
The point of this report has been to investigate how the current training and work 
directions can affect the operations of the bridge personnel on a practical level. 
Objectives were: 
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• to assess if the common bridge practices were able and sufficient enough to 
address the challenges of the operational environment from the point of view 
of managing threats and human error,  
• to assess how bridge team work should be improved and in which respects, 
and 
• to assess the effects of the current training practices and operational 
directions on real-life operations. 
The primary interest was on bridge team work in merchant shipping having an effect 
on maritime safety'. The focal point of the report was on real-life working methods 
and ways of operating as well as on how the bridge personnel rationalises them and 
understands their significance. The point of view was restricted to addressing the 
threat factors affecting safety in real-life operations as well as to confirmation 
practices aiming to detect and avoid human error in critical operations. The central 
issues were determined to be the effectiveness and adequacy of the current work 
practices, factors explaining them and possible needs and prerequisites of improving 
the bridge team work. 
1.3 Background Theories of the Report 
1.3.1 Threat and Error Management Model 
The first background theory of the report is the Threat and Error Management Model 
(image 1). The model distinguishes four different levels. External threat factors 
affecting the safety of operations through two mechanisms are described at the top. 
They contribute directly to increasing the risk levels of operations, and if managed 
poorly, they alone may constitute hazards or accidents. Moreover, the threat factors 
make the operational environment more demanding and increase the risks involved 
with errors made by the bridge personnel. This further increases the likelihood of 
accidents or hazards. From the safety point of view it is essential how the bridge 
personnel manages the threat factors affecting operations as well as the human 
errors induced by these factors. Prerequisites of safe operations include 
acknowledging and detecting the threat factors affecting operations, understanding 
their significance and applying operational practices connected with threat 
management in a meaningful way. 
The next level of the model includes the so-called internal threats, that is, errors or 
defects in the operations of the bridge personnel, which may compromise the safety 
of operations without functioning mechanisms of error detection and management of 
consequences. Typical examples among the bridge personnel are deficiencies in being 
fully aware of the current situation. These can lead to navigational errors and further 
to hazards. 
The third level of the model is comprised of those common practices in the operations 
of bridge personnel which are developed for threat and error management. 
Functioning bridge team work and effective resource management are in central roles 
in this process. Threat management involves effective communications among bridge 
personnel as well as anticipatory and preparatory practices helping bridge personnel 
in creating a common plan for ensuring safe operations in spite of the heightened risk 
levels. Error management includes confirmation practices involved with critical 
1  The report does not investigate operations of the bridge personnel on smaller vessels operating in the field of 
commercial activities, like inland passenger vessels and tugboats. See more accurate outlining from 2.2.1 
Accident and incident reports. 
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operations, monitoring of operations or, for example, confirmations connected with 
communications to avoid misunderstandings. 
The fourth level of the model describes the results of operations. Operations of the 
bridge personnel determine whether threats and errors add up to hazards, or can 
operations be kept safe in spite of the heightened risk levels. Errors may also cause 
new errors which further increases the probability of hazards. 
External threats Expexted I 
events I 	I 
risks 
Unexpected 
I 	events / 
risks 
I 	External 	I 
error 
Internal threats 
Errors of 
Bridge 
Personnel 
N _________ 
Bridge operations 
(co-operation and 
resource 
management) 
Practices for 
Threat Recognition I 
and Error Avoidance 
I 
I N Practices for Error 
Detection and 
 Manageme  
- 
Outcome 
Maintaining 
Safe 
Operations 
I 
I 	Additional 
Error 
r  Recove 	to Safe 
Operations - 
induced 
s nt 0 r 
cident 
Image 1. Threat and Error Management Model (according to Heimreich, Klinect, Wilhelm, 
1999). 
Analysis focused mainly on the co-operative practices of the bridge personnel 
presented in the middle section of the model above. Aims of these practices are to 
recognize and manage threats as well as to detect and manage errors. The objective 
was to study the operational practices the bridge personnel use in real-life to achieve 
these goals. Central questions regarding operational practices include:  
• Which factors in the operational environment have an effect on the operations 
of the bridge personnel? 
• How do members of bridge personnel communicate these factors to each 
other? 
• How are these factors taken into account in operations?  
• Which human errors are typically connected with operations?  
• How the errors made in operations are normally detected?  
• What particular methods are used in error management?  
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Essential factors in threat and error management are functioning co-operation among 
the bridge personnel and co-operation between the bridge personnel and outside 
actors as well as efficient management of resources. There are various human and 
technical resources available on the bridge for threat and error management. These 
can provide essential information and help in error detection, or they can be used in 
workload management to avoid errors induced by excessive workloads. Use of these 
resources is based on operational practices helping in prioritising the available 
resources in a timely manner in the most appropriate way for each situation. 
The framework of this report is knowingly restricted in describing operations of the 
bridge personnel only from the point of view of factors affecting safety and error 
management of the bridge personnel operations. The model used as the review 
reference cannot be considered as a comprehensive structural model of work, since it 
leaves out much of the content which is not directly related safety. However, it helps 
in focusing in the most essential operational practices and ways of action. 
1.3.2 Classification of Human Errors 
The aim of this report was to determine what kind of human errors are made at the 
bridge. This was considered justified because there are various conventions that can 
be applied to controlling different errors. By recognizing some of the typical errors it 
is possible to direct development measures efficiently into the most critical stages and 
tasks of operations. 
However, it has to be noted that source books recognize several different approaches 
in the classification of error types. A universally excepted way of classifying human 
errors does not exist; each definition is best suited for the pursuit of some specific 
goals. According to the model used in this report, human errors were divided into the 
following five main groups (Helmreich, R., et al 1999): 
1) intentional noncompliance errors 
2) procedural errors (memory lapses, mistakes, slips) 
3) communication errors 
4) proficiency errors and 
5) operational decision errors. 
The first type of error is connected with disobeying given instructions or orders. The 
consciousness and intentionality of the actions is essential in classifying this error. 
There may be various different motives and reasons underlying the actions, and they 
can be connected with both the individual and the organization they work in. The 
person committing the misconduct may,  e.g.: think that the regulation he is breaking 
is not relevant in the situation, commit the misconduct because his work requires it, 
see the misconduct as an opportunity to work better and faster, or feel that the 
organization expects him to break regulations in order to ensure smoothness of 
operations. Although intentional noncompliance errors should not be accepted on the 
organizational level, it is important to understand why intentional noncompliance 
errors are made in certain situations. 
Procedural errors mean errors taking place in normal routine work of the bridge 
personnel. Typical errors in work routine include memory lapses, mistakes, and slips. 
Memory lapse means forgetting of a task, a part of a task, or an individual detail 
which is included in a task. A mistake means an error where a person performs 
successfully an operation leading to a certain goal, but the outcome of the operation 
does not match the person's expectations. A slip refers to a situation where a person  
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tries to perform an operation with a certain outcome in mind, but the performance of 
the operation fails. 
Communication errors refer to errors in internal communications (information 
exchange, delivery, and understanding) between the crew members of the bridge, or 
the communications between the bridge and other actors. Communication mistakes 
are situations where communication is incomplete, erroneous, unclear, or difficult to 
understand. Also situations in which communication does not begin in time or at all 
are included in this category. Typically communication mistakes are related to 
situations in which operatively important information has not been sent, the recipient 
has not received the sent message, or the recipient has misunderstood the message. 
Proficiency errors pertain to explicit deficiencies in technical professional competence 
which might arise from personal reasons, or appear more widely in an occupational 
group due to deficient education or distribution of information. This type of errors 
differ from procedural errors in that they are not based on the failure of an acquired 
skill but are a consequence of a deficiency in mastering a skill needed for performing 
the task at hand. 
Operational decision errors are situations when a significant decision from safety 
point of view has been erroneous or poor. These errors are to do with the process of 
decision making, and not so much with the fact that the expertise needed for decision 
making would be deficient. Typically in decision making errors not all available 
information is used in defining problems or assessing alternatives. Then the decision 
made will be based on a deficient view of the situation. Decision making errors 
invariably concern situations in which there are no direct instructions or procedures to 
follow. In situations like these the crew members have to define the problem without 
clear guidelines, devise possible alternative strategies, assess the risks and benefits 
involved as well as execute decisions and evaluate their consequences. 
1.3.3 Management of Bridge Resources 
The concept of resource management and the training tradition connected with it has 
been under development in aviation since the beginning of 1980s (Helmreich et al 
1999). In its early form it was limited to the management of cockpit resources, and 
therefore it was originally named Cockpit Resource Management, abbreviated CRM. 
Afterwards the focus of the concept has been widened to include the management of 
crew resources, Crew Resource Management, because resources relating to safe 
aviation, such as cabin personnel, also exist outside of the cockpit walls. 
The starting point for the need to develop a new training field was aviation accidents 
and hazardous situations that resulted from human errors. The presented research 
results indicate that problems were not in technical professional competence but in 
communications, decision making and leadership (Cooper, white, & Laubert, 1980). 
Deficiencies in these led to situations where all the available information or resources 
were not employed efficiently enough to ensure safe operations. 
The training of resource management has later spread to other safety-critical fields, 
including maritime. The need to develop co-operative skills that improve resource 
management has been recognized also in the operations of bridge personnel. 
The concept of resource management is connected with the management of human 
resources, but it also includes the technical systems that relate to the operations of 
bridge personnel as well as all the parties outside the immediate working 
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environment offering information or work contribution which can be used in 
maintaining safe operations. 
This report also examines how the members of bridge personnel comprehend 
resource management on the bridge. The aim was to find out what human and 
technological resources they knowingly use in managing threats and errors, and 
which practices they use in executing resource management.  
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2 Implementation 
2.1 Progress of the Report 
2.1.1 Stage 1 - Analysis of Accident Reports 
Research was begun on Jun 1, 2006. The first stage consisted of the analysis of 
accident and incident reports in maritime. Some reports were chosen for further 
examination. These were reports pertaining to accidents in merchant shipping where 
bridge operations were recognized as a factor in the accident. On the grounds of the 
analysis, observations were made on the typical circumstances and situations 
underlying the accidents, and the errors made by the bridge personnel were 
classified. Written material concerning BRM training, directions, orders and practices 
was also studied in the first stage. 
2.1.2 Stage II - Operational Level Interviews 
In stage II of the research semi -structured 1 interviews for the maritime operational 
level personnel were planned, implemented and analysed. These interviews formed 
the main research material of this report. The operational level included people who 
were responsible for the operations, safety and training of shipping companies and 
Finnish State Piloting Enterprise, and further the masters, navigating officers and 
pilots involved in the operational work. The interviews were conducted between 
September and November 2006 at the organizations that took part in the research. 
The matters that were covered in the interviews were based on the observations of 
the first stage. The aim of the interviews was to find out:  
• If the views of the operational level actors correspond to the observations of 
the first stage, and on what are these views based?  
• If the actors bring forth further matters which were not detected in the first 
stage, and on what are these potential matters based?  
• How do the operational level actors recognize circumstances that add to the 
risk level of maritime?  
•  What are the concrete measures taken to control the risks that relate to 
circumstances? 
• How do the actors recognize errors in bridge work?  
• What are the concrete measures taken to avoid, detect and manage errors? 
 •  What is the meaning of BRM to the actors?  
• How does the present BRM training help with the practical work?  
• How should BRM training be developed according to the actors?  
• What are the chances of the shipping company to affect the bridge practices?  
• How do the bridge personnel see the role of the shipping company and the 
authorities in developing and supporting bridge work? 
2.1.3 Stage III - The Interviews of Training Personnel and Authorities 
In stage III of the research semi-structured interviews for the authorities and 
organizations offering BRM training were planned, implemented and analysed. The 
questions of the interview were based on the observations of the first and second 
stages. The aim of the interviews was to outline: 
1  The interview is based on previously prepared framework and questions, but the interviewees will be asked 
further questions based on their answers.  
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• What is the content of BRM training? 
• How is BRM training organized? 
• How is BRM training transferred into the practical work of the bridge 
personnel? 
• Does BRM training fit the requirements of operational work in relation to the 
accident statistics and the views of the operational actors? 
• What has been achieved with BRM training? 
• How should BRM training be developed? 
• What are the major challenges in BRM training? 
2.1.4 Stage IV - Conclusions and Report 
In the fourth stage observations made during the research work were analyzed as a 
whole, the needed additional interviews were conducted and other material collected. 
A report based on the analysis was written. The research was concluded on Jan 26, 
2007, when the report was handed over to the customer. 
2.2 Research Material and Participants 
2.2.1 Accident and Incident Reports 
In the first stage of the research work the reports of Accident Investigation Board 
Finland (AIBF, in Finnish Onnettomuustutkintakeskus OTK) on accidents and 
hazardous situations in maritime were studied. The data consisted of all the reports 
that had been completed during the existence of AIBF (103 altogether), which had 
been published on the AIBF website (http://www.onnettomuustutkinta.fi/2601  .htm) 
by Jul 31, 2006. 52 reports were chosen for further study, on the grounds of the 
following criteria: 
• Only accidents that involved merchant ships were chosen. All the accidents 
that had happened to leisure boats or Navy and Coast Guard vessels were 
excluded, except the accidents (collisions) between a merchant ship and e.g. a 
yacht. In these cases the accident was analyzed partly from the point of view 
of the leisure boat. 
• Only those merchant ships were included whose deck officers were required to 
meet the qualifications of a watchkeeping officer at least. This criterion 
excluded almost all the accidents that had happened to inland passenger 
vessels, tugboats and fishing vessels. This exclusion was justified with the fact 
that BRM training is available only in the training of watchkeeping officers. 
• Also most accidents involving cargo or caused by a technical fault, a fire etc. 
were excluded. This exclusion was justified with the fact that in these cases 
bridge work did not have a clear effect on the accident. 
• Accidents clearly caused by fatigue or falling asleep were also excluded. This 
was justified by the fact that the causes and control of these accidents do not 
directly relate to the aims of this report. However fatigue has been taken into 
account in the analysis of hazardous situations or accidents in which it has had 
an effect on e.g. decision making. 
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2.2.2 Shipping Companies 
Seven Finnish shipping companies were invited to take part in the research, and all of 
them participated. All these shipping companies have a well-defined and well- 
functioning land organization, and they are all experienced shipping actors. The 
shipping companies included both passenger companies and cargo companies. Two or 
three deck officers of each company were interviewed, i.e. captains and navigating 
officers. In addition to this, one land organization officer responsible for bridge 
directions and/or training was interviewed. 
2.2.3 Finnish State Piloting Enterprise 
Piloting was studied by interviewing two of the Finnish State Piloting Enterprise pilots 
and two members of the administrative staff responsible for directions and training of 
piloting. The amount of pilot interviews was only two, because two studies had been 
made earlier concerning piloting operations (OTK, 2004 and VTT, 1998). Furthermore, 
on the grounds of the aim of the report, the study of piloting operations was only 
conducted in its limited function as a factor in the bridge operations of merchant 
ships. 
2.2.4 Training Organizations 
Four navigational training organizations were invited to take part in the research, and 
all of them participated. People responsible for BRM training from  Kymenlaakso and 
 Satakunta  Universities of Applied Sciences,  Sydväst Maritime, and Meriturva Maritime 
Safety Training Centre were interviewed for the report. All these training 
organizations offer BRM training for both professional navigation students and 
shipping companies. Meriturva Maritime Safety Training Centre does not offer 
professional navigational degree courses. 
2.2.5 Authorities 
The point of view of the authorities was included by interviewing three officials from 
Finnish Maritime Administration. The interviewees came from different functions of 
the organization, from Vessel Traffic Management and Maritime Safety and Security. 
The interviewees from Maritime Safety and Security represented both Maritime 
Inspections Division and Seamen's Division. 
2.2.6 Legislation 
In the first stage of the research it was examined what kind of legislation concerning 
bridge work exists and how the legislation directs the BRM operations on the bridge. 
There are several regulations that concern bridge operations, of which the following 
are essential from the point of view of BRM operations: 
• Maritime Law (674/1994), 
• Decree on the Manning of Ships, Certification of Seafarers and Watchkeeping 
(1256/1997), 
• Decision of Ministry of Transport and Communications Finland on Manning 
Ships, Crew Qualifications and Watchkeeping (1257/1997), 
• Pilotage Act (940/2003), 
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• Government Decree on Pilotage (982/2003), 
• Vessel Traffic Service Act (623/2005), 
• International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, 
• STCW (International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers), 
• SOLAS (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea), 
• ISM Code (International Safety Management Code 2002) and 
• HSC Code (International Code of Safety for High-Speed Craft 1994). 
2.3 Method 
2.3.1 Methodological Foundation 
The methodological foundation of this research was a problem-based study of 
operations which was directed at predetermined operational practices of the bridge by 
the usage of a selected research framework. Through this approach it was examined 
how the bridge personnel understand and interpret their actions and their operational 
environment. It was also examined how they describe their working methods with 
which the risks involved in human performance on the bridge could be controlled. By 
examining the prevailing practices it is possible to formulate models and measures 
that will help in the further development of operations and practises. 
The prevailing practices were studied via interviews. From them it was also possible 
to examine the opinions and conceptions that underlie the practices. On the grounds 
of the interviews, it was possible to examine what was the role of experience, 
training, or the directing of the operations of the organization in the formation of the 
practices. Thus it was also possible to assess the influencing mechanisms in the 
organized development of work practices. By comparing our results with the 
theoretical models on which our research was based on, it was eventually possible to 
assess the prevailing conceptions and practices of safety in relation to the goals and 
principles of threat and error management. Accident and incident reports were also 
used in examining the work practices. 
2.3.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
The main body of research material consisted of interviews of experts which were 
conducted in all the organizations that took part in the study. Data was collected dur-
ing September-November 2006 by visiting all these organizations. The interviewees 
represented both the operative level actors and training organizations as well as au-
thorities. 
The research material preceding the interviews included accident and incident reports 
of Accident Investigation Board Finland, which were published on the web pages of 
the Board (www.onnettomuustutkinta.fi ) by July 31, 2006. 52 reports were examined 
further (see section 2.2.1, Accident and Incident Reports). The selected reports were 
studied, and special attention was paid on the chain of events and operations on the 
bridge. The following information was searched in each report: 
• Type of accident (grounding, collision, capsizing/sinking, other hazardous 
situation); 
• situation / operational environment (departure or arrival to the port, piloting, 
navigating in confined waters (not piloting), navigating at open waters, other 
situation); 
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• crew on the bridge (watchman, mate, master, pilot, other crew member, 
bridge crew in total);  
• nationality of the vessel /  crew  /  shipping company;  
• circumstances or other factors that had an effect on the accident (poor 
visibility, twilight or darkness, wind, snow, sleet, or rain, current, effect of ice, 
traffic situation, heavy or disturbing radio traffic, other distracting factors);  
• other factors that had an effect on the accident (technical fault, system or 
equipment deficiency, special qualities of the vessel, lack of control of the ship 
system, deficient skills and knowledge, lack of training or practising, fatigue, 
problem in bridge team work, deficient directions, lack of standard procedure, 
lack of memory-based emergency procedure, too small crew at the bridge);  
• location of essential information pertaining to prevention of the accident (a 
person at the bridge, at the bridge, at the engine room, on another ship, 
Vessel Traffic Service, other location);  
• 	deficiencies in so-called non-technical skills: co-operation, leadership and 
managerial skills, situation awareness, decision making  (Elin et al, 1998); 
• deficiencies in threat and error management (anticipation of threats and 
errors, control of threats and errors, control of non-safe spaces) and  
• type of human error (intentional noncompliance errors, procedural errors, 
communication errors, proficiency errors, operational decision errors). 
Summaries of the circumstances and causes of accidents were made on the grounds 
of the gathered information. Deficiencies in so-called non-technical skills and the 
management of threats and errors as well as the types of human errors were con-
sidered as individual cases. Summary was not made on these factors, as their role in 
accidents was not necessarily included in the report. 
The 52 reports chosen to be examined further were:  
• 2004: Bl, B7, C3, C4, C7 
• 2003: C4, C6, C8 (two separate cases), C9  
• 2002: C2, C3, C9, dO, Cli, C12, C13 
• 2001: Bl, C4, C9, C20, C14, Finnreel (MAIB examined)  
• 2000: B2, B5, Cl, C2 
• 1999: C6 
• 1998: Bl, Cl, C2, C4, CS, C8, C9, ClO, Cli, C13 
• 1997: Ci, D2, C4, C6, C7, Cii, C14, C15, Ci6 
• 1986-1996: 1/1995, 2/1995, 3/1995, 1/1994, Estonia 
In the second stage of the research, after the analysis of the research material, the 
interviews of the operative level officers were planned and conducted, i.e. the person-
nel of shipping companies and Finnish State Piloting Enterprise. The interviews were 
semi-structured. The interviewees were first asked open questions, which were then 
further specified with follow-up questions. As concrete examples and descriptions as 
possible of the views and practical level work of the interviewees were sought with 
the follow-up questions. The interviews covered matters brought forward by the inter -
viewees themselves as well as the observations that surfaced in the first stage ana-
lysis of the accident reports. 
In the third stage the interviews of training organizations and authorities were 
planned and conducted. The authorities interviews were also semi-structured in the 
same way as the second stage interviews of the operative level staff had been. The 
training organizations were sent their questions before the interviews, because the 
questions also concerned factual information on BRM training which would have been 
difficult to present from memory.  
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The interviews were confidential. Most of the interviews were made in person, with 
the exception of Meriturva Maritime Safety Training Centre where the answers were 
given in writing only. In addition to this, the Kotka BRM training organization was in-
terviewed on the phone. The people present at the interviews were the interviewee 
and a representative of Huperman. At some interviews there were two Huperman 
representatives present. All the interviews were recorded and later transcribed. After 
this, a summary was made of the interviews, where the answers to the same ques-
tions were pulled together. 
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3 Findings and Analysis 
3.1 Threat Management 
3.1.1 Circumstances that Have an Effect on Safety 
In this report the factors that increase the risk level of shipping were examined from 
the point of view of the factors influencing the actions of bridge personnel. 
Circumstances that have influenced the actions and performance of the bridge 
personnel have been defined as threat factors, according to the threat and error 
management model (see section 1.3.1. Threat and Error Management Model). Threat 
factors are factors that exist outside the crew members' power and elevate the risk 
level of the crew members' operations. For the crew the factors can be very ordinary 
and expected, or rare and surprising. The bridge personnel under study also found 
the errors of other actors which were connected to their work as threat factors. 
Typical threat factors having an effect on accidents are different working conditions. 
Threats influence safety via two mechanisms: Threats bring risk factors into the 
operations, and if not managed appropriately, may by themselves cause a hazardous 
situation or an accident. Furthermore, threats require higher level of competence in 
the work done in the operational environment and add to the risk of errors made by 
the crew. These in turn add to the likelihood of an accident or a hazardous situation. 
On the grounds of the accident and incident reports, conditions have a great effect on 
the hazardous situations and accidents of sea traffic. In nearly all the accidents 
chosen to be studied in this report an external factor had an effect on the accident 
(image 2), such as weather conditions (hard wind and poor visibility), ice conditions, 
current, confined waters, traffic conditions, heavy radio traffic, or some other 
individual factor (e.g. poor channel alignment or a faulty navigational aid). 
Effects of External Risk Factors on the Accident 
Circumstances had 	One circumstantial U Two or several cir- 
no effect on the 	factor contributed 	cumstanbal factors 
accident 	 to the accident 	contributed 
Image 2. External risk factors have had a great effect on the accident. 
The following figures illustrate the presence of some of the most significant 
circumstantial or conditional factors in accidents. On the grounds of the analysis of 
the accident and incident reports, most of the accidents (92%) happened in an 
archipelago or in confined waters (image 3). The challenges of navigating in confined 
waters were also invariably brought out in expert interviews. 
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Accidents in Confined Waters 	Time of Day When Accidents  Occurrec 
• Navigating atU Navigating ln 
open waters 	confined wa - 
or other si- 	ters •Twilight or Daylight 
darkness 
Image 3. Accidents happened mainly in 	Image 4. A significant amount of 
confined waters. 	 accidents happened during twilight or 
darkness. 
On the grounds of analysis of the accident and incident reports it was discovered that 
most of the accidents happened during dusk or darkness (image 4). However, it was 
not possible to determine whether darkness had an effect on these accidents based 
on the reports. The opinions of the interviewees were divided on the matter of an 
elevated risk level due to darkness. Some thought that darkness did not have an 
effect on the risk level of operations, because driving in the dark is a part of the 
normal operations, and on the other hand, the lights of vessels and safety equipment 
make it easier to navigate the vessel during darkness. Others felt that darkness 
increased the risk of operations, because then some of the smaller vessels may be 
left unnoticed, and also judging distances is difficult. 
Visibility in Accidents 
	 Wind Effects on Accidents  
•  Poor visibili- U Good visiblil
-ty 	 ty 
•  Wind cont- Wind  hadT 
ributed 	no effect 
Image 5. Almost 40% of the accidents 	Image 6. Wind had an effect on 
happened in conditions of poor visibility, most of the accidents in our research 
material. 
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More than a third of the accidents in our research material accidents happened in 
conditions of poor visibility (image 5). The interviewees agreed on that poor visibility 
adds to the risk of operations, and it poses a threat to safety. 
Experts mentioned in the interviews that other weather conditions that add to the 
operations risk level include wind (see image 6), rough seas, and ice conditions. 
Heavy traffic, fishing boats that behave unexpectedly, and errors made by other 
vessels such as ignoring the obligation to give way, were brought out as the risk 
factors caused by other seafarers. Some of the interviewees also mentioned fatigue, 
tediousness of watches and lowered alertness levels as a result of this, technical 
failures, automatic alarms, and some unexpected events such as sudden illnesses or 
fires (more usually happens on passenger vessels) as factors of elevated risk levels. 
Many interviewees felt that entering and leaving ports as well as piloting were 
operations susceptible to risks. They felt that the embarkation and disembarkation of 
the pilot are especially risky, particularly in rough seas. In addition to this, some 
interviewees felt that piloting elevates operations risk levels because it breaks the 
normal work routines of the bridge: the pilot is not a member of the normal crew, 
their role is not considered clear, and the pilot often practically replaces the 
navigating officer from his driver's seat. Some also felt that as the pilot is not as 
familiar with the ship as the ships own bridge personnel, it is possible that this 
causes problems during piloting. 
3.1.2 Threat Management on the Bridge 
Threat management means the operations of the bridge personnel with which they 
try to minimize the risk posed by threats. Threat management includes threat 
recognition, comprehension, and the choice and use of a suitable operational strategy 
or procedure with which the threat is avoided, or with which the negative effects of 
the threat on safety are minimized. 
During expert interviews it was noticed that threats are recognized well, but that 
bridge operations are not changed determinedly to match the elevated risk level. This 
was noticeable also in the analysis of accident reports. There are different controlling 
methods used inconsistently on the bridges that relate to risk consideration. Some of 
these practices are fairly sophisticated, and others are very deficient. Most 
interviewees mentioned that general alertness and watchfulness increases, and the 
amount of bridge crew will be increased if necessary. Usually this means summoning 
the master to the bridge. However, bridge operations are clearly altered only when a 
so-called two navigator system, also called the pilot - co-pilot method, is used (this is 
used on both cargo and passenger ships; on cargo ships one of the navigators is the 
master (and the other is the watchkeeping officer), and on passenger ships usually 
the company's own pilot). 
The interviewees mentioned the following individual practices (among others) in 
threat management: 
• In the dark a lookout comes to the bridge (required in STCW Code, section 8), 
• On conditions of poor visibility a lookout is usually summoned to the bridge, 
and the master is notified at least when visibility decreases under certain level 
(most often 2 miles). The master makes the decision to stay on the bridge or 
leave according to the situation. 
• When driving in a narrow channel almost all shipping companies use the so- 
called two navigator method when one person is responsible for steering and 
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the other for monitoring. Narrow fairways usually involve the obligation to use 
a pilot. Using a pilot can also be considered as risk management method. 
• In hard wind and rough seas the master usually comes to the bridge. In 
situations like this (as well as in other situations which require his presence on 
the bridge), the master's role may be that of the monitoring officer (the so- 
called pilot - co-pilot method) or a supporting officer / adviser, depending on 
the practices of the shipping company, the vessel, and on the master himself. 
In some cases the master may have responsibility of steering, and usually the 
navigating officer will then act as the monitor. If there already are two 
navigators on the bridge, the company's own pilot and the watchkeeping 
officer, the master does not have a clearly defined personal role as the third 
member of the commanding team. Then he rather takes on the role of a 
supporter / adviser. 
• In hard wind the control will be changed to manual steering if necessary, and 
operations are more focused on steering the ship. 
• If the ship enters port in hard wind, some shipping companies use a 
distribution of work where the steering officer (usually the master) will 
concentrate on steering the ship and the other officer on the bridge on 
monitoring the situation (e.g. other traffic) more extensively. 
• In ice conditions there is usually a lookout on the bridge prepared to assume 
the duties of a helmsman, if necessary. The master may also be present on 
the bridge, if necessary. 
• In a heavily trafficked area the lookout or the master will add to the bridge 
crew. 
• If fishing boats or other vessels cause difficult situations, the watchkeeping 
 navigations  officer may summon the master to the bridge. 
• Fatigue and the tediousness of watches were considered so typically a part of 
the work at sea that the interviewees felt that everyone should just be able to 
cope with them themselves. If necessary, a lookout or the master may be 
called in to give assistance. 
• Automatic alarms are usually dealt with by the watchkeeping personnel 
themselves. In situations which require special attention the master is called 
to the bridge. 
• Unusual events on the ship, such as a technical failure or a sudden illness, 
usually change the work routines on the bridge. Depending on the situation 
and the practices of the shipping company, the master usually takes command 
and decides on necessary measures together with the bridge personnel. 
On the grounds of the research, the shipping companies have not given special 
directions on how to manage threats or operations in risky conditions. However the 
amount of directions given varies according to the companies. Some individual 
procedures were found on which directions had been issued. They were to do with 
threat management or operations under risky conditions. Mostly the directions 
related to the bridge crew and often to the calling of the master (also mentioned in 
watchkeeping regulations). Furthermore, directions have been given on distribution of 
work, responsibilities, and tasks. Implementing the directions in practical work has 
been left to the bridges and to the responsibility of the masters of vessels. In the 
interviews the masters mentioned they considered the current level of direction too 
general, and some wished for clearer directions. 
The ISM Code of the SOLAS Convention requires that the shipping companies 
establish plans and instructions for shipboard operations (section 7). The code does 
not clarify, however what kind and what level directions are required, and the code 
does not contain instructions for application. Therefore, the shipping companies 
cannot offer more defined instructions for the definition of directions based on the 
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requirement of the authorities. In connection with the safety management systems 
audits, the authorities may give direction or offer advice on the practical operations, if 
necessary. 
In the research it was noted that professional maritime training does not include 
training in threat management. The reason for this might be that the framework of 
threat and error management is under the process of entering many safety critical 
industries, where it could be used as a development tool for operations and training. 
Training does include preparations for different situations, or operations in unusual 
situations, but it is not systematically examined what kind of threats bridge 
operations contain, and with what methods these threats can be managed. Even BRM 
training does not include the point of view of threat management. 
3.2 Error Management 
3.2.1 Error Types in Bridge Operations 
An adapted version of Heimreich Error Classification Model was used in this report to 
divide errors in five different main groups: 1) intentional noncompliance errors, 2) 
procedural errors which include memory lapses, mistakes, slips, 3) communication 
errors, 4) proficiency errors and 5) operational decision errors (Helmreich et al, 
1999). All these error types were found in the accident and incident reports. The least 
deficiencies were found in knowledge and skills. The amount of other error types was 
almost equal. 
Within our research material, it is not possible to report exact statistics on the errors 
found in the reports. All the errors made in connection with an accident may not have 
been mentioned in the reports, and a report-based analysis of errors that had an 
effect on the accident is difficult to do afterwards. The errors found in this research, 
however, give some indications as to the effects of errors on accidents. 
Expert interviews supported the analysis of accident and incident reports. Errors in 
the realm of skills are fewer than other errors. The interviews also showed that 
seafarers' awareness of different errors is not extensive. Actors found their own 
actions and errors in their own performance especially difficult to analyze. 
When considering the importance of errors in safety it is good to separate errors and 
their consequences from each other. Some errors may occur often, but their 
consequences are not common. Then again some rarely-occurring errors may in all 
likelihood lead to consequences. It is important also to take the seriousness of the 
consequences into account. 
3.2.2 Intentional Noncompliance Errors 
Intentional noncompliance errors mean such activity, actions committed or operations 
left undone, that the member of the bridge personnel knows to be against the 
directions or regulations that concern him. The consciousness and intentionality of the 
actions is essential in classifying this error. Various motives and causes may be 
behind the misconduct that can pertain to the individual or to the organization. The 
person committing the misconduct may, e.g.: think that the regulation he is breaking 
is not relevant in the situation, commit the misconduct because his work requires it, 
see the misconduct as an opportunity to work better and faster, or feel that the 
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organization expects him to break regulations in order to ensure smoothness of 
operations. Although intentional noncompliance errors should not be accepted on the 
organizational level, it is important to understand why intentional noncompliance 
errors are made in certain situations. By understanding the motives and influencing 
them it is possible to cut down on the amount of intentional noncompliance errors. 
On the grounds of the accident report analysis, intentional noncompliance errors most 
often concern the neglect of the route plan (OTK 2002c, 1998d and 1998g, among 
others). First of the three of the most frequent intentional noncompliance errors is the 
neglect of watchkeeping in one way or another (e.g. the neglect of lookout or the 
leaving of the previous watchman before the new one has had a chance to familiarize 
himself with the situation; OTK 2002d and 2001b). The second is failure to follow 
regulations concerning resting time (and thereafter working in a fatigued state, due 
to this, OTK 2000b), and the third sailing with too small a bridge personnel (usually a 
lookout or helmsman was missing; e.g. OTK, 1998e). Other individual intentional 
noncompliance errors included using Finnish in a piloting situation, although the 
shipping company regulations required the use of English  (Sjöfartsverket, 2003), and 
failing to use a so-called dead man alarm, although regulations stated that it should 
have been on in all situations where there were only one person on the bridge (OTK 
et al, 2000a). 
The interviews also revealed some intentional noncompliance errors. These were e.g. 
letting another vessel too close when navigating in fog or in ice, neglecting 
watchkeeping by doing something else at the time, such as paperwork, and 
neglecting the monitoring of piloting against the directions of the shipping company. 
English accident investigators (Marine Accident Investigation Branch, MAIB) have also 
noticed that bridge crews commit such intentional noncompliance errors. In their 
2005 report (MAIB, 2006) it is stated that well-trained  navigations officers, who have 
proper equipment and who had been given a lot of support in their work, for some 
reason did not follow regulations and neglected some of the very basic tasks, such as 
watch keeping. 
3.2.3 Procedural Errors 
Procedural errors mean errors taking place in normal routine work of the bridge 
personnel. Typical errors in work routine include memory lapses, mistakes, and slips. 
A memory lapse means the normal forgetting of a whole task, a part of a task or an 
individual detail included in a task. A mistake means an error where a person 
performs successfully an operation leading to a certain goal, but the outcome of the 
operation does not match the persons expectations. A slip refers to a situation where 
a person tries to perform an operation with a certain outcome in mind, but the 
performance of the operation fails. 
On the grounds of the accident report analysis, procedural errors have had an effect 
on the accident in several cases. For instance, memory lapses were involved in 
accidents in situations where the bow thrusters control was forgotten to be changed 
from the bridge wing to the centre console (OTK, 2004a), or the steering control was 
forgot to be switched from the autopilot to the manual steering (OTK, 2004b). 
Mistake type errors were found e.g. in accidents that related to monitoring maritime 
safety equipment. In one case a green sector light was mistaken for a green buoy 
light (OTK, 2003a), and in another two similar buoys were confused with each other 
(OTK, 1997c). Other errors included e.g. making a mistake with the radar scale, and 
therefore getting the distance to the turn reference wrong (OTK, 1997a). An example 
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of a slip was the turning of a NFU steering lever to the left by accident, when it should 
have been turned to the right (OTK, 1997a). 
Most of the interviewees named procedural errors the most typical errors in bridge 
work. The most important errors mentioned were mistakes in stating helm 
commands, and mistakes in setting the direction to the autopilot. Furthermore, 
several interviewees mentioned errors that related to the observation of other vessels 
or targets. Connected to these, at least partially, were situations where a turn was 
not tight enough or the vessel started the actions to avoid the collision too late. Also 
errors in the estimation of speed were recognized as typical errors by several masters 
of ships. 
3.2.4 Communication Errors 
Communication errors refer to errors in internal communications (information 
exchange, delivery, and understanding) between the crew members of the bridge, or 
the communications between the bridge and other actors. Communication mistakes 
are situations where communication is incomplete, erroneous, unclear, or difficult to 
understand. Also situations in which communication does not begin in time or at all 
are included in this category. These errors are typically found in situations where 
operatively important information has not been sent, the recipient of the information 
has not received the message, or the recipient misunderstood the message. It is 
typical in situations relating to communications errors that bridge personnel or other 
actors possess relevant information for the situation, which is not be used in the 
situation. 
The accident report analysis was rich with communication errors. In general, it was 
possible to notice after many accidents that discussion on the bridge was very scarce 
(e.g. OTK, 2004a and 2002b). This was also implied by the fact that there was no 
discussion between bridge personnel on the changed circumstances or situations. 
Examples of this are accidents where the effects of hard wind conditions (e.g. OTK, 
2002a, 2001a and 1997c), or traffic situation (e.g.  Sjöfartsverket, 2005) had not 
been discussed. Communications errors were found in piloting situations, too. In the 
investigation of several accidents it had been noted that preparation for pilotage had 
been deficient. The ship's crew did not give enough information to the pilot on the 
characteristics of the ship (e.g. OTK, 1997b and 2002c), or the pilot had not told the 
crew enough about the route, or the route was not discussed at all onboard (e.g. 
OTK, 1999 and 1998b). In addition to this, it was noticed that in two accidents the 
discussion on engine or equipment failure was not sufficient between the bridge and 
the engine room (MAIB, 2002 and OTK, 1998a). The engine room crew had 
information on the situation, but for some reason only a part of it was given to the 
bridge. Then again the bridge possessed information which would have helped in 
assessing the situation in the engine room. 
In the interviews the problems of communications were mostly related to situations 
where there were two navigators on the bridge. Many interviewees mentioned that 
then the monitoring officer might, for instance, assume that the steering navigator 
has also seen the oncoming vessel, and therefore fails to mention it. This 
communications mistake does not always have consequences, if the assumption is 
correct, but if the steering navigator has not noticed the vessel in sufficient time, the 
consequences may be very severe. These kinds of situations were reported to occur 
in piloting. Then the lack of discussion was considered to relate more to a hindrance 
in communications caused by authority gradient, and to the fact that the bridge 
personnel trust the skills of the pilot too much. 
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3.2.5 Proficiency Errors 
Proficiency errors form a group of errors which refer to erroneous action resulting 
from deficiencies in professional competence and knowledge. The deficiencies may be 
caused by either personal reasons such as motivation or abilities, or organizational 
reasons, such as the quality or quantity of guidance and training. 
Accident reports contained only a few errors resulting from proficiency errors of the 
bridge personnel. In some accidents the skill of using the emergency steering 
equipment was deficient (e.g. OTK, 1998a and 1995). Furthermore, in some accidents 
the crew was not able to use the automated systems properly (e.g. OTK, 2001a, 
1995). These cases seem to be caused by deficiencies in the organizational level. In 
order to exclude the relevance of training and directions in these cases, it should be 
shown that these operations had been determined as training goals, and that they 
were a part of the basic training and revision which the personnel were given. 
During the interviews, experts did not mention directly any errors relating to skills, 
but several interviewees described the ever increasing and more and more 
sophisticated automation as a problem. Regarding automation, which is meant to 
increase safety and make the work easier, as a problem may be due to lack of 
training. 
3.2.6 Operational Decision Errors 
Operational decision errors are situations when a significant decision from safety 
point of view has been erroneous or poor. Thus, this error relates to the process of 
decision making, i.e. the consequence following the decision does not in itself mean a 
poor decision or an error in decision making. Situations and errors cannot be treated 
as decision making situations or errors, if sufficient time has not been given to the 
making of the decision, or alternative ways of action have been unavailable. An error 
in decision making also occurs if a decision is not made although the situation calls 
for one. A good decision making process includes defining of the decision situation 
(the problem), defining the options, defining the risks involved in the options, a plan 
of action and implementation, timing, monitoring of the situation (the requirements of 
the decision), monitoring of the consequence of the decision, and the reassessment of 
the decision. From the point of view of the bridge team work, good decision making 
should be reflected in the communications of the bridge personnel. 
Several decision making errors were found in the accident reports. Some of these 
were related to the deteriorated circumstances. The ships voyage was continued 
despite the poor weather conditions for navigation and steering (e.g. OTK, 1998d, 
1998e and 1997b), or berthing was attempted although the wind conditions were 
extremely difficult (e.g. OTK, 2004c, 2002a and 1997c). In addition to this, in some 
accidents the bridge crew could have chosen an alternative, safer route in the present 
conditions, but for some reason did not wish to do so (e.g. OTK, 1999 and 19981). 
Experts did not mention decision making errors in the interviews. However, in some 
interviews it was noted that the decision of staying in the port in hard wind can be 
difficult to make. On one hand this can relate to the pressure of keeping the schedule, 
and on the other hand to certain kind of professional identity - a conception that a 
professional can control the ship and the situation in more difficult circumstances, 
too. 
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3.2.7 Detection and Management of Errors 
Error management means the actions of the bridge personnel with which they try to 
avoid and detect human errors and minimize their consequences to the safety of the 
operations. Error management is based on the understanding of the errors people 
usually make. Error management includes the recognition of situations and 
circumstances in which the making of an error is likely or possible, and the outlining 
of the possible consequences to safety. On these grounds such a plan of action is 
chosen with which the possible error will be detected efficiently and early enough, 
and the possible consequences of the error can be prevented or minimized. 
Typical error management practices are timing of the work, managing of the work 
load, checking procedures, preparation methods, and check lists. Error management 
methods can be used in individual work performances, but the co-operative methods 
specifically designed for error management bring significant synergy and safety 
margins into the bridge work. 
During the interviews the experts were asked what kind of errors are usually made on 
the bridge, and what is the typical way of detecting these mistakes on the bridge. 
Answering these questions was difficult for the interviewees, because they did not 
have a clear conception on what the different forms of human errors are. They were 
able to answer the questions once the subject was clarified and they were given 
alternatives: is the error usually detected by another member of the bridge crew, or 
does the person who made the error detect it himself, is the error detected because 
of an automated error message or possibly after a situation has resulted from the 
error. The majority of the interviewees felt that most often the error is detected by 
another member of the bridge crew. This is the case especially when the pilot  - co-
pilot method is used (there are two navigators on the bridge, who may be  e.g. the 
master and the navigating officer, or the company's own pilot and the navigating 
officer). Many also felt that people usually detect their own errors at some point, 
usually after a situation has arisen in consequence of the error. For instance, if a turn 
has been started too early, it will be detected during the turn, when the turn is not 
following the intended plan. Or, when there is a situation of reduced alertness, the 
oncoming vessel is noticed only when it has passed the limit of the normal safe 
distance. This does not necessarily lead to the failure of the action to give way, but 
the planning and executing of the manoeuvre has to be done in less time than 
usually. 
On the other hand there were only few predetermined and previously instructed error 
management methods used on the vessels. In practice, it was noted that there was a 
varying number of good error management practices in use. The interviews revealed 
that although all vessels were using some working methods that improve error 
management, they were not necessarily considered as error management methods. 
Often the method used was meant to be a practice that would improve safety in 
general, and it was not meant to prevent a certain error or its consequences. Several 
interviewees felt that BRM practices are practices which attempt to prevent errors. 
However, they could not define more closely what would be the effect of different 
practices on error management. 
The most distinct error management method used on all vessels was the check list. 
Check lists had been made at least for departure procedures, but most vessels also 
had a check list for arrivals. Other check lists concerned e.g. the changing over the 
watches, pilotage, and approaching to open seas or coastal waters. The lists were 
made to ensure that all the important tasks in the situations in question had been 
done. Almost all the interviewees revealed that the so-called closed loop  
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communications principle (the recipient of the message repeats the key elements of 
the message) is an important method of ensuring the correctness of communications. 
However. this general level communications principle had not been more closely 
defined as far as the contents of the message and the situation were concerned. The 
interviewees also mentioned that there are some call-outs that are used onboard the 
vessels. These expressions are not officially defined, however. Monitoring of other 
members of the bridge crew or the pilot seemed to be an error management method 
in some situations. Often monitoring was not considered as an action performed in 
order to detect and avoid errors, and it was not specified as monitoring of predefined 
critical operations in certain situations. The interviewees presented also other error 
management practices. For instance, one master had acquired a method of visually 
enhancing the direction message by pointing a hand to the direction where the ship 
was turning. 
It was significant that although some working methods were considered good, their 
usage was required, and training was provided, they had not been written down as 
official directions. The writing down, instructing, and systematic use of good work 
practices did not seem to be part of the shipping companies policy. 
When reviewing the contents of maritime professional training it was noticed that 
training does not support the error management work on the bridge. The present 
 BRM  training includes short sections on the limitations of human activity, types of 
human errors, and error management on a general level. However, the training does 
not systematically cover the real-life operations used for error detection and 
management. 
3.3 Management of Bridge Resources 
Management of bridge resources is defined as the use of all the generally available 
human and technical resources to ensure safe and efficient operations. All such 
operations that are to do with the use of people, information or equipment can be 
classified as resource management. On the grounds of the accident and incident 
reports and expert interviews, in this report observations were made on different 
resource management practices which are classified under the following headings: 
Communications Practices, Monitoring Practices, Lookout, and The Use and 
Management of Automation. 
3.3.1 Communications Practices 
In safety critical operational environments within the realm of the crews work there 
are numerous situations in which significant information to the operations is 
transferred either between the members of the crew or between the crew and an 
external actor. As the information is transferred via communications between people, 
there is a generally recognized risk of misunderstandings. In order to avoid them, 
many different communications procedures have been developed in several 
industries. Call-outs (short standardized words or word pairs) and standard 
phraseology (standardized ways of expressing critical messages) are the most 
common methods used to avoid misunderstandings. 
In maritime call-outs and standardized phraseology are used only little. However, in 
radio traffic standardized English phraseology is generally used. In internal 
communications there are some standard phrases used in different commanding  
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situations, such as when giving steering or helm orders or orders for berthing and 
unberthing. 
In safety critical environment it is important for the message sender to make sure 
that the recipient has received the message and understood it correctly. To ensure 
this a procedure is used where the recipient shows the sender that he has received 
and understood the message correctly by repeating the key content of the message. 
This way, by listening to the reply, the sender may be assured that the 
communications has been successful. This so-called closed loop communications 
principle appears to be well-known in maritime. It is likely that the fact that the 
importance of this principle is emphasized in BRM training has an effect on this 
matter. This communications principle is applied onboard vessels e.g. in situations 
when there is two officers on the watch. Then the officer responsible for steering 
states aloud what he is going to do, and the monitoring officer repeats the gist of the 
intended procedure. 
One significant problem in communicating critical information is the lack of 
communications. This was detected as having had an effect on several accident 
reports analysed for this study (see section 3.2.4 Communication Errors). 
Speechlessness was also named in the interviews as a commonly recognised problem 
on the bridge. Experts believed that the reason for this is the prevailing authority 
relations that have an effect on the communications atmosphere and make it harder 
to communicate openly information which is considered significant. On the other 
hand, it was also mentioned that there were very different opinions within the bridge 
personnel on which matters require communicating. 
The problems of communications have been tackled at BRM training courses. The 
features of good communications are covered in the training (a suitable atmosphere, 
an interactive situation, the closed loop communications principle). Also the 
importance of briefing and debriefing is emphasized in the training. However, training 
focussing on attitudes and describing principles does not seem to increase 
communications as desired. Although the personnel working on the bridge have been 
given BRM training for over a decade, and all the interviewees had received BRM 
training, the lack of communications was still seen as a major problem. 
In order to improve communications, the situations where it is needed should be 
defined better. Training and directions should clearly state what, why, and when 
matters should be communicated and how communicating should be done in order for 
it to be efficient and safe. Consciousness of the importance of communications is not 
enough. It became clear during the interviews that although the importance of 
communications is recognized and the working procedures support open 
communications, some of the important information is still not communicated further. 
The reason for this usually is that the bridge crew members feel differently about 
what information is so essential that it should be communicated to other crew 
members. 
3.3.2 Monitoring Practices 
Monitoring refers to the actions of a member of the bridge crew with which he tries to 
follow and check the events and work in the operational environment. As a concept 
monitoring can be divided into passive or reactive, and active or anticipatory 
monitoring. 
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The difference between passive and active monitoring is related to the control over 
the human observation process. In a normal situation, it is often difficult for an 
observer to notice the difference between customs, but in several situations where 
active monitoring makes it possible to manage an exceptional situation, passive 
monitoring does not lead to good results. 
Passive monitoring means the general following of the operations. The general level 
following is based on the presence of the monitoring officer and on stimulus-based 
reacting in situations where a deviation from the normal situation or another such 
event gives a stimulus strong enough to catch the attention of the monitoring officer. 
This stimulus can be e.g. a system warning. Weaknesses of passive monitoring are 
the inability to notice small and slowly-occurring deviations, the inability to react 
quickly to situations that demand speed, and the decrease in alertness in a 
monotonous environment. 
Active monitoring means an activity when a member of the bridge crew pays 
conscious attention to individual, previously assigned targets the state or function of 
which he monitors or checks at certain designated times. When the person monitors 
several things at the same time, he switches the targets at regular intervals. In order 
to improve safety, active monitoring requires that either the monitoring officer or the 
organization has identified the critical things and targets whose monitoring at a 
certain time is important. 
Several experts who were interviewed said that onboard their vessels a specified 
monitoring practice is in use mainly in pilot - co-pilot navigation situations. 
Monitoring responsibility is often assigned to the officer in charge of the navigational 
watch who monitors and supervises the performance of the person responsible for the 
navigation and steering of the vessel. The task of the monitoring officer is to monitor 
the location, course, speed, and turns of the ship, and other such operations 
connected with navigation and steering. He/she also monitors the performance of the 
steering officer. There are mostly short descriptions of the tasks and responsibilities in 
the ships safety management systems or bridge manuals. On the grounds of the 
interviews it is possible to say that this monitoring task has almost without exception 
been defined as a very general monitoring of all events. The interviewees said that 
they were not explained what and when they should monitor. There has been no 
training for monitoring either. Except for the described monitoring practice, other 
monitoring duties or tasks are not really defined in shipping companies or onboard 
vessels. All the bridge crew members are responsible for monitoring "everything 
important". 
The interviews revealed that the concept of monitoring was unfamiliar even despite 
the fact that it has been covered in maritime training and that it is one of the most 
important concepts of the BRM training course. The examples the interviewees gave 
were most often related to operations where the movements of another vessel are 
monitored on the radar, or the position of own vessel are monitored from the radar, 
an electronic chart, or by visual sighting. Only one interviewee gave a clear example 
of what matters and in which order he feels should be monitored e.g. when the ship 
is making a turn. From the interviews it is obvious that monitoring is mainly of the 
passive kind, i.e. the position and movement of the vessel is monitored on a general 
level, It looks as if monitoring practices are not covered in training on a sufficiently 
detailed level. 
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3.3.3 Lookout 
The most important basic duties of a bridge watchman are defined as safe navigation 
and especially the avoidance of collisions and grounding. To prevent collisions, the 
vessel should always keep a proper lookout both by sight and by hearing (COLREGS 
5). Also the regulations on watchkeeping emphasize the importance of lookout 
(STCW Code, section 8). The safety report on watchkeeping of the English Marine 
Accident Investigation Branch noted that two thirds of the collided vessels included in 
the research material had neglected the lookout (MAIB, 2004). Nine of the accidents 
and hazardous situations examined in the report were collisions (l7%). In two of 
these one cause of the accident was the neglect of the lookout or watchkeeping in 
general (Sjöfartsverket, 2005 and OTK, 2001b). Furthermore, in one case watching 
the radar had been neglected when the vessel was navigating in dense fog (OTK, 
2004d). 
The use of a separate lookout can be considered threat management practice on a 
general level. If the duty or duties of the lookout have been defined as including the 
detection of the errors of other members of the bridge crew, this can be considered 
an error management method. Used correctly, a lookout is a part of the commanding 
team and a remarkable resource to safety. According to regulations (STCW Code, 
section 8) a separate lookout has to be present on the bridge at least from sunset to 
sunrise. In addition to this, a lookout can be called for if the visibility decreases, or 
when otherwise needed. On passenger ships the lookout is always present at the 
bridge. 
During the interviews experts were asked about the duties of the lookouts and about 
the instruction given to them. Most interviewees mentioned that normally the lookout 
informs others only on such targets that he believes are dangerous to the vessel. 
More experienced lookouts already know which sightings interest the navigating 
officer and which do not. All the interviewees said that the actions of the lookout 
differ according to person. They believed the reason for this to be mostly that some 
of the watchmen are studying to become navigating officers and therefore they are 
interested in the duties of the officer in charge of the navigational watch. A skilled 
and motivated watchman can be a better resource and bring more additional value to 
the safety of the operations compared to those who have only been trained on 
support level. Furthermore, several interviewees mentioned that different officers in 
charge of the navigational watch may use the lookout resource in different ways. For 
instance, some may tell the watchman about the upcoming route and ask him to 
participate to the monitoring of the ships navigation. In one shipping company at 
least this was actually a general procedure. Some interviewees said that they had 
also begun radar training for watchmen. 
The interviews revealed that some shipping companies had given directions on the 
duties of the lookout. Some of the interviewees said that they assume a watchman 
knows his duties and knows how to perform them, as they have been covered in 
training. However, some had noticed that young watchmen are not skilled to do their 
duties, and that the navigating officers have to teach them how to do their work. 
3.3.4 Use and Management of Automation 
Sophisticated bridge technology is often referred to as automation. The aim of auto-
mation is to improve the safety of maritime. However, in addition to new opportunit-
ies the use of sophisticated automation systems also contains risks. Sophisticated 
automated systems perform tasks in ways which are not possible for human beings. 
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Automation improves accuracy, speed, economic efficiency and perception, and it also 
replaces human labour in several tasks. Furthermore, multi-tasking, memory storage 
and computation capacity of automation systems surpasses human capabilities. Still, 
technology is no substitute for people, because it is not responsible for actions, and 
nor does it make decisions. Automation systems cannot perform tasks that are not 
defined beforehand. Man cannot be replaced by a machine in complex operational en-
vironments where the user is required to apply information and estimate risks based 
on insufficient and uncertain information, under constantly changing conditions. At its 
best, however, automation is an excellent resource for the bridge crew. This requires 
the correct usage of it and management of risks involved. Used correctly automation 
improves the situational awareness of the bridge personnel in demanding conditions, 
lessens the workload, and frees the resources of the bridge personnel to be used for 
their main task, i.e. supports them in their threat and error management work. At its 
worst, automation weakens the situational awareness, adds to the workload, creates 
an opportunity for the occurrence of errors, and eventually causes an accident. Auto-
mation is often described as a double-edged sword. Used correctly it helps the bridge 
personnel in performing its tasks, but when used incorrectly, makes the situation 
worse. 
Successful use of automation requires defining of the principles and methods with 
which it is used. The essential points in the defining are managing of information and 
workload. The use of automation should be planned in such a way that it would pro-
duce well-timed, necessary and situationally significant information for the bridge 
personnel in different situations. Procedures should be defined for reacting to and 
commenting on the information that the system produces. The system operating du-
ties should be defined and timed so that automation is operated at correct times and 
with correct procedure, risk-wise, and that one of the bridge personnel will always 
concentrate on the primary task of navigating the ship. It is typical that automation 
causes unexpected situations from time to time on the bridge, and preparations 
should be made beforehand for those by planning procedures and practices. Monitor -
ing of automation in critical situations will also bring more challenges to the definition 
of bridge personnel operations. 
The expert interviews revealed that all the interviewees felt there were risks involved 
in using steering and navigation systems. Most of the interviewees mentioned over-
confidence on the equipment and possible equipment failure as risks. Furthermore, 
they felt that integrated navigation systems are especially complex, and the poor un-
derstanding of how they function forms a great risk. Many systems give many differ-
ent alarms which are disturbing for the normal bridge operations. The interviewees also 
stated that today, when bridges are integrated, safety of the vessels has improved. Several 
interviewees felt that the integrated bridge raises the risk level too high, because 
automation is not managed properly, and bridge work might easily be turned into "a 
computer game." In the course of this research it was noticed that the opportunities 
of increasing safety brought about by technical development have not been utilized in 
maritime training or operational systems by anticipating threat factors having an ef-
fect on the operations, and by checking safety critical procedures. Bringing new tech-
nology to the bridge environment has not in itself improved safety. High technology 
and complex automation systems require new skills from the personnel that are using 
them. Problems in these skills are also presented in the newest accident and incident 
reports (e.g. OTK, 2004a and 2001a). The challenge of today is to change the com-
munications between the members of the bridge personnel as well as the communica-
tions between the bridge personnel and technology into such that would increase 
safety. The challenges brought on by the changes in the operational environment 
should be met by organizing the duties of the users of technology to correspond to 
the challenges of the work environment. 
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In 2003 the International Maritime Organization sent a circular letter  (MSC/Circ. 
1061) in which they gave instructions on how to use an integrated bridge. The in-
structions state that shipping companies are obliged to include the company policy on 
the use of automation in the bridge manuals of their vessels. Furthermore, the circu-
lar states that explicit instruction should be written in bridge procedure concerning 
the situations in which the different automation management procedures can or can-
not be used. During the expert interviews it was noticed that instructions on the use 
and exploitation of automation or steering systems and navigation equipments were 
not available in many shipping companies. Some of the interviewees felt that the 
automation training situation is bad. However, most of the interviewees were fairly 
satisfied with the user training they had received. Many considered independent 
studying of the manual a sufficient way to learn things. 
The special characteristics of automation and automated work environment are 
covered in brief in BRF1 training. Special attention is paid to the problems of the use 
of automation. Still, either BRM training nor maritime professional training offers con-
crete operations models or methods concerning working in an automated environ-
me nt. 
It was apparent in the interviews that there are plenty of personal differences in the 
use of automation and bridge equipment. Some shipping companies have, perhaps 
following the advice of the IMO circular, regulated which equipment or systems should 
be switched on, and which functions should be used. In addition to this, some ship-
ping companies had given directions on when the track controller (when the system is 
steering the vessel exactly on a planned course) of the integrated navigation and 
steering system must not be used. Some of the interviewed masters had included in-
structions on the use of automation and navigation electronics in their standing or-
ders. One interviewed master included instructions on all the systems and equipment 
up to the adjustment level in his standing orders. He justified this by stating that the 
best ways of using the equipment do exist, and that inexperienced navigating officers 
do not always seem to know what the best way is. With his instructions he had also 
wanted to minimize all the risks involved in the erroneous use of automation. The 
other interviewees mostly felt that the use of equipment depends very much on the 
situation and circumstances, and that the bridges should be left some freedom in 
choosing the correct ways of using the equipment. From the shipping companies' 
point of view it is difficult to create a set of orders, as all the bridges have not been 
standardized. 
3.4 Factors that Explain the Operations of Bridge Personnel 
On the grounds of our research material and especially the expert interviews plenty of 
background information was gained with which the prevailing practices can be 
explained. Some of the noted factors are directly related to the direction of bridge 
work, such as training and the available work methods. Some of the factors have an 
indirect effect on the operations; they mainly create circumstances where the bridge 
personnel have to adjust their actions to meet the demands of their environment. 
3.4.1 Challenges of Bridge Work 
One of the greatest challenges of bridge work is fatigue. This problem has been 
strongly highlighted lately. Accident Investigation Board Finland is preparing a safety 
report on fatigue, and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has designated 
fatigue as one of their main themes. Any so-called fall-asleep accidents in our  
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organization. Approximately 10 years ago regular training was begun in maritime 
colleges. All the present courses are based on a course developed by SAS Flight 
Academy in co-operation with different organizations (Finnish and Swedish Maritime 
Administration, Norwegian Shipowners Association, Silja line AB, and Maritime Pilots 
Institute Netherlands). 
According to the STWC general agreement (International Convention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping) on ships crew, qualifications, and 
 watchkeeping, BRM  training is not compulsory. However, this training is given to all
operational-level students studying to be deck officers in Finland today. In addition to 
this, management-level students may be offered refreshment training, or the course 
topics are reviewed in the context of other training.  BRM training has also begun for 
students studying to be engineer officers. Shipping companies have sent their older 
employees to the BRM courses organized by schools, or they have set up their own 
courses together with the schools. Almost all members of Finnish deck officers (today 
also engineer officers) have completed BRM training. All the interviewees who took 
part in this report had completed the basic  BRM course at least, and most also the 
refreshment course. 
Today the SAS Flight Academy course has been divided into five modules. The 
modules are again divided into several different themes. Each theme is first covered 
with the help of computer based training (CBT) material (the student examines the 
material independently) and after that the matters are discussed with the help of 
different accident cases. Some simulator training models have been developed for the 
course, but schools have adapted them or developed their own simulator exercises. 
Usually the course includes one simulator exercise (duration c. half a day) towards 
the end of the course. A typical duration of the course is 3-4 days. 
Five of the shipping companies that took part in this report announced that they 
organize some kind of bridge work related training at intervals of 1-3 years. Mostly 
these are so-called emergency situation courses, which might include e.g. one BRM 
 module as a theme, or the course contains  BRM refreshment training, either the
whole course or parts of it. In some shipping company courses this separate BRM 
 module is not included, but attention is always paid to it in the context of simulator 
exercises. 
The interviewed experts mostly regarded the  BRM training they had received as 
useful. Some expressed a wish for the course to include more practical exercises. 
Opinions were not offered on the contents of the course, however. The interviewees 
mentioned that the biggest benefit from the course was that it "made them think" 
 e.g.  of their own operational practices. They felt that the BRM course focuses more on 
attitudes and philosophy than on practical operations models. They also said that the 
 BRM  course teaches the importance of communication and co-operation. Closed Loop, 
repeating the message, and the fact that thoughts and actions are stated aloud were 
mentioned as good communications methods. Co-operation usually referred to the 
fact that everybody should remember that they are not working alone, and that co-
operation leads to better results. However, they were not able to describe how the 
training had influenced their own actions on the practical level. 
The expert interviews revealed that there was no clear role differentiation between 
the schools and shipping companies responsible for the training. According to STCW 
 Code, the main function of schools would be to offer the basic training of 
 watchkeeping  officers, and shipping companies would be responsible for introducing 
their duties to them onboard the vessel. Some interviewees expressed their 
discontent with the results of the basic training. On the other hand, the educational  
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is regarded as increasing red tape and adding to the work load. Implementation of 
the directions is often left for the masters and other ship personnel. The interviewees 
did not require more directions, but they wished that the instructions would be made 
more explicit. Training should be organized before implementation of a new direction 
so that its meaning is understood and the crew is able to practise enough. Also docu-
mentation of the directions should be looked at. 
The great amount of legislation is also seen as a threat. In a recent maritime safety 
study the interviewed experts regarded the storm of legislation as one weakness in 
the management of maritime safety. New laws are constantly enacted. They increase 
the work load on the vessels, and they can become a burden. This burden may turn 
into a threat to maritime safety. (FMA, 2006.) 
The safety policy of shipping companies can be developed, and the bridge operations 
can be directed also on the grounds of the deviation and incident reports that the 
ships send. This reporting system is required in the ISM code (International Safety 
Management Code, 9.1) of SOLAS convention. The code also requires that the ship-
ping company must react and reply to the deficiencies and problems presented in the 
reports (section 9.2). The interviewed representatives of shipping companies gave 
some examples on how a problem was approached and how on these grounds direc-
tions were changed or increased, and even training organized when necessary. Mostly 
the interviewees felt that the systems are functioning welt. Some even wished for a 
more extensive database on incident reports, collective to all the shipping companies 
and possibly managed by the authorities, from which everybody could learn. This sys-
tem has not yet been constructed in Finland. 
On the grounds of the expert interviews most of the deviation reports contain tech-
nical faults. Non-conformities on bridges or other human errors are reported rarely. 
Only a few shipping companies felt that they had been able to create such an open 
working atmosphere that had enabled reports of human errors. It is noteworthy that 
in almost all the shipping companies the report can be sent only by the master of the 
ship, only in a few also the chief engineer and/or the first mate. This operational 
mode is not likely to produce information on situations where the other personnel 
have noticed deficiencies in the actions of the master. The interviews also revealed 
that people are reluctant to report their own errors. 
3.4.4 Authority Regulations 
Lots of legislation exists that relates to bridge operations. This legislation is dispersed 
into many sources. The BRM operations are not regulated by an actual law; some 
directions are given only in the recommendations section of STCW Code (Section B-
VIII/2, Part 3-1/5) on how shipping companies should guide the deck officers of their 
vessels in BRM operations. 
The STCW Code defines the minimum requirements for maritime training and 
qualifications, and for watchkeeping on vessels. The administration of IMO member 
state (Finnish Maritime Administration in Finland) is responsible for supervising of the 
requirements. The state of affairs is audited at five-year intervals, when the 
authorities have to make sure that the training provided by maritime training 
institutions conforms to the requirements of the STCW Code. Although BRM 
operations on the bridge or in the engine room are discussed in the B-section 
(recommendations) of the general agreement, it does not contain a requirement for 
BRM training. However, it is a prevailing practice in Finland that all students studying 
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to be watchkeeping officers receive BRM training (see section 3.4.2 Contents and 
Method of Implementation of the Training). 
The STCW Code requirements concerning watchkeeping training (Table A-IT/I) 
contains a general level list of contents for the training, and the criteria with which 
the students can be evaluated. The requirements do not include BRM as a concept, 
but there is a note in the training contents that can be seen as relating to the BRM 
requirements, "Thorough knowledge of effective bridge team work procedures." These 
effective team work procedures of the bridge are not defined in the requirements. The 
evaluation criteria states on a general level that watchkeeping conforms with 
accepted principles and procedures. These customs have not been defined, and the 
evaluation criteria of the bridge team work have not been written down. The 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) has published model courses to support 
maritime training. In these model courses the requirements of STCW Code were 
slightly specified. There is a model course for BRM training as well (Model Course 
1.22). Unfortunately the contents of the model course remain on a general level, 
much in the same way as with the legislation. For instance, one of the aims of the 
model course (16.1.3) is that the student can present means to prevent internal or 
external errors. The model course does not designate what these means could be. 
The references of the model course do not list such books where these means would 
be clarified. In must be noted, however, that the model course is not a finished 
training programme. The detailed training goals and contents need to be defined 
separately. 
Watchkeeping  operations are described in the STCW Code regulations (Section A-
VIII/2, Part 3-1), which in Finland is enforced with a decree (Decision of Ministry of 
Transport and Communications Finland on Manning Ships, Crew Qualifications and 
Watchkeeping, 1257/1997). There is no mention on bridge team work during 
watchkeeping. The regulation only defines the criteria of calling the master and the 
combination of the bridge watch. 
Part B (recommendations) of the STCW Code (Section B-VIII/2, Part 3-1) guides how 
a shipping company should direct BRM operations on the bridge. On May 20, 2005 
guidance was added to the Code concerning the engine room resource management. 
This guidance is a copy of the guidance on navigational watch (B-VIII/2, Part 3-2). The 
shipping company is advised to compile appropriate bridge procedures, and support 
the use of check lists. Furthermore, the company is advised to give the deck officers 
instructions on how they can continuously evaluate the use of bridge resources. The 
recommendations are given on a very general level, and they mostly repeat the 
actual watchkeeping regulations (in Part A). Simply put, the recommendations urge 
administrations to ensure that the bridge personnel are competent enough, that the 
amount of watchkeeping personnel is sufficient, and tasks are given and completed 
efficiently using all the available information and equipment. The recommendations 
do not state exactly how this should be directed and implemented in practice. One 
shipping company Safety Manager regretted how little help the regulations offer for 
making of the instructions. You are ordered by law to write directions, but no one 
explains what the directions should be like in practice. 
The ISM Code of the SOLAS  Convention requires the shipping companies to create a 
safety management system for the ships. Shipping companies should provide safe 
practices, safeguards against all identified risks, and continuously improve the safety 
management skills of the personnel (1.2 Objectives). Furthermore, shipping 
companies must establish a general safety and environmental protection policy, 
regulations and procedures to ensure the safe operations of the ship, and a reporting 
system for non-conformities (1.4 Functional requirements for SMS). The Code does not 
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contain a reference to BRM. The Code does not give instructions on creation or 
maintenance of a functioning safety management system either. 
The General section of the IMO Guidelines for Voyage Planning (SOLAS, Annex 24, 
(Res. annex to IMO Resolution A.893) states that human error contributes to 80% of 
navigational accidents, and that in many cases essential information that could have 
prevented the accident was available, but for some reason it was not used. In order 
to prevent these kinds of accidents, the IMO recommends that all decisions be cross-
checked so that possible errors could be detected and corrected as early as possible. 
Furthermore, deck officers should ensure that all available information is 
systematically utilized. However, these recommendations remain rather general, and 
they do not describe any practical implementation methods. 
In the rules and regulations the operations of the bridge personnel are guided 
separately. Bridge team work is discussed very little. Although they require to 
strengthen the bridge team, no directions on co-operation or operations with 
augmented bridge personnel have been given. The accident report analysis showed 
that in only 13 % of the ships covered in the research matter there was only one 
person on the bridge. (NB the so-called falling-asleep accidents were excluded from 
our research matter, in which there is typically only one person on the bridge.) Thus, 
accidents mostly happen in such situations and circumstances where the risk level of 
the operations has increased (e.g. in poor weather and in confined waters), and the 
bridge crew has been augmented as required by law. 
Generally it can be said that legislation is disintegrated and remains on a general 
level. Disintegration of the laws is considered a problem also among Finnish shipping 
experts. A recently completed study of maritime safety designated the fragmented 
laws, decrees and regulations as one of the threats to maritime safety (FMA, 2006). 
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4 Conclusions 
4.1 Threat Management 
Studies show that accidents and hazardous situations happen typically in situations 
and circumstances where the risk level of operations has been elevated. These risk- 
elevating circumstances and factors that lie outside the realm of actions of the bridge 
personnel are called threat factors. In almost all the accidents and hazardous 
situations that were examined one or more underlying threats could be found in the 
background. Furthermore, in the expert interviews numerous threats were nominated 
as factors that elevate the risk level. The findings of this report are in line with the 
findings made in other safety critical industries. 
As far as safety is concerned, it is essential how the bridge personnel manage threat 
factors. This entails recognition and detection of threats, understanding their effect, 
and selecting and implementing actions that reduce the effects of the threats. Our 
research showed that bridge crews do not analyze their operational environment and 
work systematically from the point of view of risk management. In the expert 
interviews, risk-elevating threats were recognized inconsistently. Many interviewees 
were able to name the same risk-elevating factors that had been found to be involved 
in accidents and hazardous situations. For instance, other studies have found narrow 
fairways to increase the probability of accidents (e.g. Perrow, 1984), and many 
interviewees agreed with this. However, only few interviewees could describe special 
procedures with which the elevated risk level posed by the threat could be reduced. 
Nevertheless, some interviewees had distinct thoughts about threat management. 
The report showed, however, great differences between shipping companies and 
bridges as far as threat management procedures were concerned. The effects of 
threats to bridge operations and further errors were also poorly recognized. 
The foundation of threat management lies on understanding human activity and its 
limitations. The effect of external disturbing factors on human activity in a demanding 
stage of work should be understood well enough so as enough attention would be 
paid to minimizing distractions in practice. Without knowledge about errors as well as 
the character of human capability and its limitations, the bridge crews cannot be 
expected to recognize such distracting factors in their operational environment that 
affect them, or to develop procedures for controlling those factors. 
Today, BRM training, in line with other basic professional maritime training, offers 
weak support in the developing of practical procedures relating to threat 
management. The training is mainly theory-oriented, and it remains in rather general 
a level. Also integration of the training to practical work is poor, and the training does 
not offer concrete practical measures for most problematic operative situations. 
Regulations and directions of authorities and shipping companies do not offer 
sufficient support to the threat and error management work of bridge crews, because 
they remain on a general level and there are no express instructions as to how to 
implement them. 
The typical maritime threat factors and their management methods have not been 
systematically defined and documented. Our report shows that on some bridges the 
crew uses operations systems with which they attempt to manage previously 
recognized threats. Bringing this so-called quiet knowledge into general use would be 
useful for development of safety in the industry. Formation of good practices into 
standard procedures in the entire work community should be the aim of the industry.  
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Several threat factors were revealed in the course of our research. These are 
presented in the figure below (image 7). 
Heavy traffic 	Confined waters 
Poor visibility I 	Watch changes  
/  Alertness 
Wind condition\ 	
ractions  Unfamiliar opera- 
tional environment 
Commu 
 Language problem 
Outsiders  
nications problems 
- 
Vessels without Inexperienced 	 Automation crew member 
problems 	navigation lights 
Technical faults Exceptional 
Unusual 	situations 	Deviation from 
local procedures 	standard procedures 
Image 7. Threat factors affecting the operations of bridge personnel. 
4.2 Error Management on the Bridge 
A typical cause or an effecting factor in an accident or an incident is a human error. 
Errors are made under all kinds of circumstances, but as the situations become more 
and more demanding, and more threats are present, the likelihood of making errors 
grows. It is generally estimated that approximately 80-85 % of maritime accidents 
are caused by human errors. On the grounds of the accident and incident reports that 
were analysed for this study, after the accident has happened, it is impossible to 
analyze all the errors that had an effect on the situation. Therefore exact statistics 
cannot be made on the errors involved in the reported accidents. However, it can be 
said that there were one or more errors underlying all the accidents and incidents. 
The expert interviews showed that the conception of errors and their management 
was rather poor among the interviewees. Making errors was not considered a natural 
part of the work, and recognition of typical situations where errors would occur was 
difficult. Only few errors and the practices relating to their management were 
generally recognized. For instance, misunderstanding of an oral report was recognized 
as a possible error, and the Closed Loop communications principle was designated as 
a way of managing it. This principle is covered in  BRM training. Although the 
interviews revealed that there are some error management practices in use on 
bridges, the users did not recognize the methods they were utilizing as error 
management practices. 
Poor understanding of errors is explained by the fact that the current professional 
maritime training does not contain training of the fundamentals in human capability 
and error management. Basic training in this field is the prerequisite for  
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understanding and recognizing the limitations of a person's own actions as well as the 
situations where the risk of making errors is great, and their consequences would be 
considerable. 
Today, error management on bridges is based on the bridge crews intuitive 
conception of safe operations. The procedures in use cannot be justified or explained 
in general. Regulations and directions do not include explicit instructions or 
descriptions of practices with which error management should be implemented on the 
bridge. 
4.3 Training and Direction of Operations 
Work support is divided into two fields: training, and direction of operations. Direction 
of operations can be viewed as containing the rules and regulations of the authorities, 
the regulations and instructions of shipping companies, and supervision. Directions 
are implemented with the master's standing orders. The main function of training and 
direction of operations is to provide bridge crews with the information they need in 
order to manage the maritime safety risks efficiently. However, on the grounds of our 
research matter it seems that the support offered by training and directions for the 
management of bridge resources is not sufficient. Directions usually only remain 
general level statements. 
The current BRM  basic training does not meet the challenges of operations. The 
training programme contains theory-oriented courses, and it covers working in a 
safety critical environment only on a rather general level. Despite the efforts of the 
colleges to include the themes of the course in other basic training,  BRM training 
remains an isolated theme and does not integrate into practical operations. At the 
shipping companies' own training courses a slightly better connection is established 
with practical operations. However, refreshment courses mostly lean on the themes of 
the basic training, and therefore their application level does not differ significantly 
from the basic training. BRM  training is mostly regarded as attitude training and a so- 
called operations philosophy, and not as procedures and practices that aim to such 
bridge resource management which the bridge personnel uses in the management of 
the threats and errors in their operational environment. 
The expert interviews revealed that as far as training and direction of operations is 
concerned, co-operation of different actors is sometimes poor. A recently completed 
study of the management of maritime safety also highlighted a need for more active 
participation of business life in maritime training and its development  (FMA, 2006). 
Due to lack of co-operation between the people who are responsible for operations 
and personnel training, training is not necessarily focused on threats that are most 
essential for shipping companies. Training should be planned based on operational 
needs. In this respect shipping companies and training institutions should invest more 
on reconciliation of their training objectives. 
The authorities and the shipping companies felt that managing bridge operations was 
rather difficult. They felt that bridge crews did not welcome the increasing amount of 
more specific regulations or recommendations, and therefore they did not consider 
issuing them a good alternative even if they felt there was need for them. Restricting 
the master's authority was considered a poor option. There were distinct differences 
in the directions of shipping companies as to how they limit the authority of the 
master. Some consideration had been given to increasing the amount of regulations 
and intervention from the part of the shipping companies. Many masters felt that  
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many current regulations were not useful, and that increasing the amount of 
regulations might even make their work more difficult. Many masters also felt that 
the regulations were too general, and that there was no mention on how they should 
be followed in practice. Instead of regulations, many masters expressed a need for 
more detailed instructions on how to follow regulations.  
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5 Recommendations 
5.1 Learning from the Best Practices 
From the point of view of threat and error management, there are remarkable 
differences in the quality of bridge operations. In is noteworthy that several bridge 
teams and individual team members have adopted their own practices in their work, 
with which they try to improve the safety of their actions. These practices often rise 
from experience and they are based on intuition. Although the practices are good and 
well-justified, people often cannot justify their meaning or significance, and they are 
not perceived as good practices for threat and error management. The safe bridge 
operations used in many bridges are what is called tacit knowledge, which is 
transferred from person to person locally and slowly, and therefore cannot be offered 
for general use. 
The existing tacit knowledge, i.e. the safe operational practices which are used and 
approved by bridge crews, contains a substantial potential for the development of 
maritime safety. Finding these practices and bringing them to general use as 
directions should be the goal of future development work. In a written form, good 
practices will offer concrete operations models and procedures for real operative 
challenges and problem situations. The authorities and shipping companies should 
create and develop processes for finding both the shared and individual tacit 
knowledge of bridge crews. This knowledge should be distributed to everybody via 
directions and training. 
Efficient finding, understanding, and transferring of good practices requires a shared 
viewpoint from which threats, errors and human conduct are perceived. A shared 
viewpoint defines the structure and language with which the practices are analyzed, 
assessed and communicated. By the recommendation of the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation, a Threat and Error Management Model is generally used in the 
development and training of aviation safety. This model has been found to be well- 
suited for the same purpose in other industries as well. 
The use and transfer of good practices require that the users understand the 
fundamentals and significance of these practices. As the practices are based on 
management of threats and errors, the users should be offered training on the 
subject. Training will give them a basis to review their own work practices and the 
meaning they have on safety, and it will help them to accept justified new practices 
as part of their own work routines. Without basic training there is a danger that these 
good procedures are seen as new unjustified regulations that will just make work 
more difficult. 
5.2 Development of Operations Procedures 
Efficient bridge team work is based on clearly defined roles, areas of responsibility, 
and distribution of duties as well as on work procedures with which the work and 
responsibility of others is supported, and, if necessary, interfered. These are 
prerequisites for smooth teamwork, management of interruptions, avoiding ambiguity 
and misunderstanding, monitoring, and the mutual support of the bridge personnel. 
Each member of the bridge team should always be aware of who is responsible for 
what, and whose responsibility the various situational tasks and monitoring duties 
are. The teamwork definitions should be done to cover normal procedures and all the 
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foreseeable emergencies. The definitions of responsibilities and roles offer a basis for 
the situational work distribution performed by the master. These definitions are the 
realm of the organization, and they should appear as directions and regulations to the 
end users. 
In complex safety critical working environments there are often many ways of 
performing tasks. Despite this, the choice of how to perform tasks should be based on 
predefined values, priorities and operational principles which aim to describe the basis 
of safety in the work. A substantial part of normal work and most foreseeable 
emergencies can be examined beforehand, and many justified good practices for 
handling them can be defined to ensure safe management of operations as efficiently 
as possible. These procedures function as tools and instruments for the bridge crews 
who have to choose the operating methods that ensure the safety of their work. 
These tools help them to understand the environmental threats and error-induced 
risks they have to manage. Development of these procedures is the responsibility of 
organizations, and this should be done in constant co-operation with the operative 
level. The procedures should appear as concrete operational directions to the end 
users. 
The 	essential 	factors 	for 	well-functioning 	procedures 	are 	functionality, 
appropriateness, practicality, and the users' approval. In general it can be noted that 
procedures that are regarded as unfamiliar or bad will not be used. The wide usage 
and approval of procedures requires that the users understand their pedigree and 
commit to them. The users should be offered training which explains the background 
of the procedures, and they should be made a part of the development process of the 
procedures. After the first stage of their implementation, development of the 
procedures should continue as a process. 
53 Development of BRM Training 
BRM training should meet the needs of the operational environment better. Today 
 BRM  training is considered as attitude training, or a philosophy relating to bridge 
operations. This is, however. only one part of  BRM training, and in itself does not offer 
sufficient support for practical operations.  BRM training should be developed into a 
course which takes BRM away from the principle level and more towards practical 
operations. The bridge crews should be offered distinct safety enhancing procedures 
and practices for handling normal situations and foreseeable emergencies. 
Educational objectives of the training should be defined based on operational 
requirements. Training should offer solutions for management of predefined operative 
threats as well as errors made by the bridge personnel. This practice-based course 
should also be integrated into operations by connecting the educational objectives to 
simulator training where the procedures can be trained in practice. 
Understanding the background of threat and error management practices is vital for 
perceiving, understanding and utilizing them. Offering the bridge personnel training 
on human capabilities and error management creates a basis for their risk 
management operations. This training should give the bridge personnel basic 
knowledge of the strengths, weaknesses, and limitations of human activity. The 
current BRM training does not sufficiently highlight the basic starting points and 
limitations of human activity. Consolidating this training would be extremely 
important so that the later-stage error management practices and bridge teamwork 
training, which are built on this foundation, can be delivered successfully.  
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At the moment the basic BRM training is offered in the form of courses. As  BRM 
 practices form a central part of safe routine operations, the objectives of  BRM training 
should be integrated into the operative training given to students.  BRNI objectives and 
skill requirements should be listed in the educational contents of operative training. 
The concept of BRM should be expanded to relate to all the safety-ensuring non-
technical operations of an individual bridge team member as well as the teamwork of 
the bridge personnel. The concept of resource management should also include 
management of resources external to the bridge. Furthermore, the importance of 
automation management training as a central part of  BRM training should be 
increased. 
5.4 Development of Direction of Operations 
The roles of authorities, shipping companies, and masters should be clarified in dir-
ecting the operations of bridge personnel. It appears that instead of general regula-
tions and directions, the masters would require concrete instructions and proposals 
on how the operations should be implemented and instructed. However, the authorit-
ies and the shipping companies fear that concrete instructions could be seen as an in-
vasion of the master's territory. 
More support for direction of operations should be offered to the masters and the 
members of the bridge personnel. Instead of unconditional regulations, implementa-
tion of current directions and instructions should be clarified. More training and in-
structions for the application of directions is required. Authorities and shipping com-
panies should give the masters distinct instructions and models on how the regula-
tions and directions can be applied into practical operations. It would be important to 
see to that regulations and directions would not remain just general remarks on im-
portant issues but that they would offer practical tools for the masters who have to 
consider them in their work. Authorities should also consider adopting a consulting 
role in order to support the shipping companies and masters in their implementation 
work. Authorities could also function as the organizers of co-operation between differ-
ent actors of the industry. 
5.5 Development of the Educational Systems of the 
Organization 
This report shows that several shipping companies use a reporting system in which 
the ship's master reads the bridge crew reports before sending them forward to the 
shipping companies. In the interviews the representatives of the shipping companies 
mentioned that few reports are received on the actions of the masters in general, and 
on the errors made by the ships personnel in situations that did not lead to 
consequences. 
The reporting system that is managed by the master is not likely to produce 
information on situations where the crew finds a fault in the actions of the master. 
Therefore each member of the crew should have an opportunity to file individual 
safety reports to the shipping company. Reporting should also be confidential in order 
for it not to cause an unnecessary risk for deterioration of the working atmosphere. 
The few reports of the crew on errors which did not lead to consequences indicate 
that these errors are not recognized, reporting them is not regarded as necessary, or  
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that reporting them is considered a sensitive issue. As little training is offered to 
bridge personnel on human capability, human errors and error management, it is safe 
to assume that errors are often not recognized. In any case, the reporting tradition as 
an information gathering and processing channel for a safety critical system should be 
developed.  
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6 Summary 
In this report the development needs of bridge co-operation for the improvement of 
maritime safety were examined. The report is based on research on current bridge 
operations and the factors that affect them. This research was done by Huperman Ltd, 
and it was ordered by the Finnish Maritime Administration. 
One of the objectives of this study was to assess the sufficiency of the prevailing 
bridge practices in meeting the demands of the operational environment from the 
viewpoint of threat and human error management. Other objectives were to define 
the possible development needs and targets of bridge co-operation, and to estimate 
the effect of the present educational practices and direction of operations on practical 
operations. This report is based on analysis of accident and incident reports, study of 
the directions that regulate bridge work and training related to it, and interviews of 
operative personnel and educational organizations. 
Our research showed that the co-operative practices of bridge crews that relate to 
threat and error management differ considerably between shipping companies, 
vessels and crews. It was also noticed that the bridge crew training, and the 
regulations and directions the crews use, do not give them practical instructions for 
or distinct understanding of the procedures of threat and error management. In 
maritime, the concept of Bridge Resource Management is usually understood as a 
philosophy of bridge communication, not as a group of operational principles and 
procedures with which the technical and human resources can be utilized in threat 
and error management as efficiently as possible. The link of BRM training and 
directions to the practical operations is weak, and no training is offered for managing 
risk-elevating threats and errors. 
It was also found that the seafarers and organizations that took part in this study 
were very willing to develop the operations and prevailing procedures. But it was 
considered difficult without further guidance and better understanding of the practical 
implementations of crew co-operation. 
On the grounds of this report development targets were defined. These targets relate 
both to development of operations, and to direction of training and operations. The 
aim is to increase safety by developing the procedures of bridge co-operation. 
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